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Endogenous Information and Privacy in Automo-






This paper examines the implications of insurers’ offering a voluntary monitoring tech-
nology to insureds in automobile insurance markets with adverse selection and without 
commitment. Under the consideration of the inherent costs related to the loss of privacy, 
the paper analyzes the incentives of insureds to reveal information, whereby they can 
decide how much or what quality of information to reveal. It is also allowed for the pos-
sibility that high risk individuals might mimic low risk individuals. The resulting market 
equilibria are characterized and it is shown, that it might be optimal for insureds to reject 
the monitoring technology, but also that under certain conditions, which are specified in 
the paper, it might be optimal for insureds to reveal complete information. Concerning 
the welfare effects of introducing voluntary monitoring of insureds, if low risk individu-
als reject it, there will be no change to either risk type. If they accept it, this will make 
them better off and high risks may either be made better off or worse off depending on 
the initial equilibrium before a monitoring technology is offered. Unless it is optimal for 
individuals to reveal either zero or complete information, an all-or-nothing nature of the 
monitoring technology will not be efficient. 
Keywords: adverse selection, privacy, insurance, risk classification, endogenous infor-
mation acquisition 
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1  Introduction 
More and more everyday objects are equipped with sensors, processing and communi-
cation technologies, which enable them to collect and exchange various types of data. 
The development of these networked technologies, often referred to as ubiquitous com-
puting, will have important implications for economic transactions and in various mar-
kets. At this stage this statement is supported by the example of insurers using monitor-
ing technologies in automobiles. Driving style and driving behaviour can be monitored 
with increasing precision and be used for the inference of individual risk.
1 Thus indi-
vidual insurance premiums can be calculated with the effect that adverse selection and 
moral hazard are being alleviated.  
This paper is concerned with the problem of adverse selection. Individual monitoring of 
the driver undoubtedly provides a better basis for the calculation of individual risk than 
the conventionally used personal and automobile-related data, which are declared by the 
insureds. Indeed, it is quite difficult to distinguish between pieces of information per-
taining to the characteristics of a driver and those, which are associated with his behav-
iour. Nevertheless some kinds of data refer rather to characteristics than to behaviour, 
since drivers can hardly control them. Such are for example acceleration and braking in 
contrast to speed, adherence to traffic signs and regulation or usage of driving belts, 
which in turn are easier to be affected consciously.  
A problem, which inevitably arises with the spread of monitoring technologies, is the 
loss of privacy. The growing scope and precision of collected data about the frequency 
and duration of trips and rests, the exact location and route of the vehicle, the time of 
the day and chronology of drives, or the number of people in cars, not only allows an 
improved calculation of individual risk, but also reveals information about the prefer-
ences of the drivers, their consumption behaviour, leisure activities etc. On the one hand 
individuals are often reluctant to reveal such data per se because of the inherent prefer-
ence for privacy. On the other hand the problem is exacerbated by the improved storage 
capabilities and the growing network connectivity, which is implied by ubiquitous com-
puting. Especially when privacy rights are not well defined, shared information, be it 
remunerated or not, can be combined with other data and entail the make-up of com-
plete consumer profiles, the performance of more accurate price discrimination and the 
                                                 
1 See Filipova/Welzel (2005) for a description of the parameters which can be monitored. An exemplary 
prototype of a monitoring technology is described at http://www.vs.inf.ethz.ch/publ/papers/ubi-
comp2005-tachograph-video.pdf. - 2 - 
misuse of data. Indeed, individuals buying insurance can opt for a monitoring technol-
ogy in order to alleviate the negative impact of asymmetric information, but they have 
to trade it off against the costs of losing privacy.  
In Filipova/Welzel (2005) it was shown that the availability of a black box contract in 
the market raises social welfare by reducing asymmetric information even in the case 
that some of the insureds have costs related to the loss of privacy. A crucial assumption 
for this result is that a black box contract is offered in addition to the conventional ones, 
so that insureds have the right of choice concerning the revelation of information. How-
ever, the nature of this choice is also assumed to be all-or-nothing, i.e. insureds may 
either choose a black box contract revealing perfect information about their risk type or 
a conventional contract without a black box. This all-or-nothing nature of the revelation 
quite well reflects the contract sets, which are presently being offered by insurers, who 
apply monitoring technologies, since the quality and duration of the collected data are 
invariably determined by the company.
2 However, in order to refine the analysis con-
cerning privacy costs and get a better understanding of the effects of upcoming tech-
nologies, which will allow for an ever increasing precision and scope of the collected 
data, it is purposeful to put the question about what implications will result from indi-
viduals being able to choose the quantity and quality of information they reveal. There-
fore some of the former assumptions are revoked and replaced by others which either 
better describe the real-life applications or better serve to approach the posed problem. 
Specifically, the questions, which arise in the context of offering a voluntary monitoring 
technology with variable information to insureds, and which are examined in this paper, 
refer to the quantity (quality) of information, which individuals will reveal in equilib-
rium and to the factors which influence their decision; what contracts will result in equi-
librium as a consequence of the revealed information; and also to the welfare effects of 
offering a monitoring technology to insureds. Another question concerns the efficiency 
compared to a situation with all-or-nothing revelation of information, for which it is 
necessary to find out the conditions, under which it is optimal for insureds to reveal no 
information or complete information, respectively.  
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 contains some related literature, on which 
the paper draws. Section 3 presents the general setting of the model. In section 4 the 
resulting equilibria are examined: 4.1 concerns the case that before a monitoring tech-
                                                 
2 See Norwich Union http://www.payasyoudriveinsurance.co.uk/info.htm and Progressive 
https://tripsense.progressive.com/home.aspx. - 3 - 
nology is offered, a no-subsidy equilibrium persists; in 4.2 the equilibrium results are 
formally derived; 4.3 concerns the welfare implications of offering a monitoring tech-
nology; in 4.4 the procedure of the previous sections is repeated to analyze the case that 
the initial equilibrium is a cross-subsidizing one. The conclusions are presented in sec-
tion 5 and finally some of the derivations and proofs are placed in the appendix.  
2  Related Literature 
The analysis relies heavily on Hoy (1982). He examines the welfare implications of 
imperfect risk categorization in insurance markets under adverse selection. Thereby he 
applies two separate equilibrium concepts for the case that a Rothschild/Stiglitz (1976) 
no-subsidy equilibrium does not exist. Unlike Hoy, who performs the analysis sepa-
rately with the assumptions of the Wilson E2 Pooling equilibrium and of the Myazaki-
Spence equilibrium, this paper focuses on the second equilibrium concept only. The 
reason for the author to omit the Wilson E2 Pooling equilibrium in this paper is, that the 
results are qualitatively very similar to those of the second equilibrium concept and 
hence no substantial additional insights can be derived. All theorems, which are derived 
for the second equilibrium concept, also hold for the Wilson E2 Pooling equilibrium. 
Since the Myazaki-Spence equilibrium also applies the assumption of Wilson fore-
sight
3, further on it will be called Wilson-Myazaki-Spence (WMS) equilibrium
4. As in 
the analysis by Hoy (1982), this paper examines the welfare effects of categorization 
only in a Pareto-sense. Similarly to Hoy (1982)’s results there will be situations, in 
which there are both winners as well as losers and therefore in those cases no Pareto-
type improvement takes place.  
There are other approaches to examine the welfare implications of categorization, which 
are not used here. In their analysis of the efficiency effects of categorization Crocker / 
Snow (1986) incorporate the possibility of hypothetical compensation of the losers by 
the winners. This approach implies the intervention by a regulator, who even if need not 
be better informed about insureds’ types than the market agents, is though necessary in 
order to implement such compensation schemes. Naturally this analysis leads to results, 
which differ from those by Hoy (1982). Still, with this approach no inferences can be 
made about the efficiency of unregulated market equilibria.
5  Another approach of ex-
amining the welfare implications of categorization is used by Hoy/Lambert (2000) who 
                                                 
3 See Hoy (1982, 324).  
4 For instance Dionne/Doherty/Fombaron (2000) use this term.  
5 See Crocker/Snow (1986, 323). - 4 - 
consider the equity effects. The authors distinguish two components of “total discrimi-
nation” - horizontal discrimination, which occurs when individuals are misclassified, 
and vertical discrimination, which occurs when a particular group of individuals has to 
subsidize another group of individuals.
6 Hoy (2005) in turn assumes “fully interperson-
ally comparable and cardinal utility functions”
7 to measure social welfare. This paper 
corresponds to the approach by Hoy (2005) only to the extent that besides ex post also 
ex ante expected utility is calculated. As argued by Hoy (2005) the “maximization of 
utilitarian social welfare turns out to be the same problem as maximizing an individ-
ual’s ex ante utility (i.e., ex ante to revelation of person-specific information)”
8. But the 
author goes much further than is done in this paper and, in order to compare the welfare 
effects of different information regimes, he uses the Lorenz curves for the correspond-
ing distributions of income, i.e. he incorporates the aspect of equality besides that of 
efficiency into the measurement of social welfare. As mentioned above, this paper per-
forms no interpersonal comparisons.  
A central aspect of the analysis in this paper are the incentives for individuals to accept 
a monitoring technology and thereby to reveal information to the insurer. In this respect 
there is a far reaching correspondence to the literature on the incentives of individuals 
to acquire additional information
9, most of which refers to the example of genetic test-
ing in health insurance markets. Although the situation, described in this paper concerns 
the revelation and not the acquisition of additional information, as shall be seen below, 
both problems are very similar in the core, since both concern the value of information. 
The informational environment, described in this paper, presents a situation, in which 
individuals with prior hidden knowledge can acquire additional private information (at 
least concerning high risks), which they can possibly report to the insurer, but at the 
same time the information status of insureds is observable by insurers (insurers know, 
which individual installs a monitoring technology). A very similar scenario in the con-
text of health testing is analyzed for instance by Doherty/Thistle (1996) in the case of 
“unreported negatives and verifiable positives”
10, particularly in the case of informed 
low risks and uninformed individuals. The authors find, that information in this scenario 
has a positive value for individuals, so that in equilibrium they will perform the health 
                                                 
6 See Hoy/Lambert (2000, 105-108). 
7 See Hoy (2005, 3). 
8 See Hoy (2005, 7). 
9 For a review of this literature see Crocker/Snow (2000) and Dionne/Doherty/Fombaron (2000). 
10 See Doherty/Thistle (1996, 92). - 5 - 
tests. There is a lot of other literature on the private and social value of information
11, 
but in contrast to it this paper allows for the quantity (quality) of information to be en-
dogenous. A similar approach, which allows for the amount of information to be a con-
tinuous endogenous variable, is adopted by Taylor (2004). But the problem setting he 
studies is quite different from the one in this paper in that he analyzes a situation, in 
which firms decide how much information to gather about customers in a competitive 
product market. His research is motivated by the question how much privacy should be 
granted to consumers from a normative point of view in the context of internet-based 
consumer data. However unlike in this paper, in Taylor (2004) the consumer’s taste for 
privacy is justified by the trade-off between an increasing price and a decreasing prob-
ability for trade to take place when the amount of information rises
12 and not “with the 
inherent preference for privacy on the part of individuals”
13. 
The problem of privacy in the environment of advancing information technologies has 
not been studied extensively yet. The traditional articles related to this topic are by 
Hirshleifer (1980), Stigler (1980) and Posner (1981), Posner (1978). It is only in recent 
years, that the problem of privacy has become of interest to research. Papers, which 
bear a relationship to various aspects of privacy include Varian (1996), Acquisiti/Varian 
(2005), Calzolari/Pavan (2006), Taylor (2002) Dodds (2002), Hui/Png (2005), Herma-
line/Katz (2005). 
3  General Setting of the Model 
Keeping in mind the purpose of the analysis, and in order to keep things as simple as 
possible, institutional characteristics of the automobile insurance market like minimum 
coverage level or compulsory insurance, which are considered to be irrelevant for the 
subject of matter, are neglected. Therefore the model is more suited to describe compre-
hensive insurance rather than third party liability insurance, which is quite more regu-
lated. The market is assumed to be perfectly competitive and insurers, who are risk-
neutral, set insurance premiums r  and the indemnity d . The assumption, that insurers 
can ration the insurance coverage, reflects the restriction for individuals to buy insur-
ance policies from only one insurer at a time and the fact that insurers offer different 
                                                 
11 See for instance Doherty/Posey (1998), Crocker/Snow (1992). In contrast to the better part of the lit-
erature, which deals with adverse selection in perfectly competitive insurance markets, Buzzac-
chi/Valletti (2005) examine the incentives for firms to use classification variables as the result of 
strategic interaction in oligopolistic markets. 
12 See Taylor (2004, 5). 
13 See Taylor (2004, 16). - 6 - 
deductible
14 levels from which the individuals may choose. An insurance contract is 
thus described by the pair (,) dr. As argued above, it is technologically feasible to col-
lect information i about the style of driving. Thus insurers are able to offer both con-
ventional contracts without monitoring and contracts, which include the monitoring 
technology (information contracts).  For the purpose of simplicity it is assumed that the 
installation of this technology and the review of the data incur no costs. Unlike in the 
existing real-life examples it is additionally assumed, that the individuals can choose 
how much or what kind of information to reveal. This means, that individuals can 
choose the specific kind of information they reveal, e.g. location data, speed or distance 
traveled; or the precision of this information, e.g. if the maneuvers of the vehicle are 
tracked in the range of meters or centimeters; or the length of records, i.e. individuals 
may choose which particular time segments of the recorded driving activity to reveal to 
the insurer. The quantity or quality of information is normed  [0,1] i∈ ,  0 i =  meaning 
that although a monitoring technology is installed, no information is revealed after-
wards, and  1 i =  meaning either that the whole length or that the complete quality of 
record (100%) is submitted. This would also imply perfect information concerning the 
risk type. Values in between suggest both that individuals are able to cut out and with-
hold certain time segments of the records or / and that they can choose which kind of 
information to submit and thus affect the “accuracy” 
15 of information. For the insurer 
this will result in a less precise calculation of risk. For example, an individual might 
“cut out” the segment containing a certain trip, by which the insurer will not know how 
fast he was driving in this period. Alternatively, the individual could submit the whole 
length of record, but withhold certain types of information, for instance the location 
data. However, the insurer will not know how often he was driving on highways or on 
country roads. In order to avoid unnecessarily burdensome formulations, in the follow-
ing quantity of information, i.e. duration of the records, will be used also to refer to 
quality of information,  i.e. scope or accuracy of the disclosed data.  
The initial endowment of individuals is denoted by W . There are only two states of 
nature: either there is no accident (NA), or an accident (A) with a monetary loss denoted 
by L, (LW < ) occurs. There are two types of individuals, which differ in the probabili-
                                                 
14 When a fixed loss and only two states of nature are assumed, it makes no difference for the make-up of 
the model if talking about indemnities or deductibles. 
15 Intended reduction of the accuracy of data as a technical solution to the problem of losing privacy is 
proposed for instance by Jiang/Hong/Landay (2002). A more sophisticated concept for individuals to 
determine the quantity and quality of revealed data is described by Duri/Elliot et al. (2004, 698), who 
consider the allowance of different degrees of revelation of data in so called privacy policies. - 7 - 
ties of accident – low risks and high risks with a probability of loss  (0,1)
L p ∈  and 
(0,1)
H p ∈  respectively, where 
H L p p > , and a proportion of the population q of low 
risks, and (1 ) q −  of high risks. Individuals know their own risk type with certainty and 
risk type is private information. All individuals have the identical concave utility func-
tion ( , ) ( ) ( ) Vwi uw gi =− , which is common knowledge,  ( ) uw being the standard von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of net wealth, with  '( ) 0 uw> , ''( ) 0 uw < , and 
() gi, with  (0) 0 g = , the disutility from revealing private information, i.e. the inherent 
cost, related to the loss of privacy.
16 For the reasons explained above it is assumed that 
the disutility disproportionately increases in information,  '( ) 0 gi> ,  ''( ) 0 gi>  for  0 i > ; 
still, at  1 i =  the marginal disutility is assumed to be finite ( '(1) g α < , (0, ) α ∈∞ ). Since 
individuals, who consider submitting the “first unit” out of the whole set of collected 
data, are likely to be able to select some information whose revelation does not affect 
privacy, it is further assumed that  '(0) 0 g = .  
The purpose of this paper is to compare individuals’ expected utility when only conven-
tional self-selecting contracts are offered, with their expected utility when, in addition 
to conventional contracts, insurers also offer contracts with monitoring, so that indi-
viduals may choose. One way to do this is to compare the situation “before” with the 
situation “after”, however assuming that those firms, which offer monitoring, do not 
know how individuals have self-selected before that.
17 Thus the time structure is as fol-
lows (see Figure 1). Starting from a situation, in which only conventional self-selecting 
contracts are offered, insurers may offer an optional information contract. An informa-
tion contract prescribes that a monitoring technology is installed into the vehicle in the 
beginning of the data collection period. Insureds may either accept it or reject it. In both 
cases during the data collection period the original conventional contracts remain effec-
tive. During this period the device performs a non-stop and full quality record of data, 
which is however kept by the particular insured. In the end of this period insureds, who 
have installed the monitoring technology, i.e. who chose the information contract, may 
review and evaluate the collected data and then decide if and how much of it to disclose 
to the insurer. Based on this information, insurers update their beliefs about the risk 
                                                 
16 As can be seen, the cost term in the utility function is independent of risk type. The reason is that it 
stems from the inherent preference for protection of privacy, which is assumed to be common for all 
individuals. 
17 If firms knew the kind of self-selecting contract a specific individual holds, there would be no use of 
monitoring whatsoever, because by choosing one of the self-selecting contracts, the individual re-
veals its risk type. The assumption might seem unrealistic for countries, in which insurers exchange 
information on their customers. It could be avoided by a setting, in which monitoring precedes the 
point of time, when all contracts become effective and during data collection there is no insurance.  - 8 - 
type of the insureds and revise the contract set to be offered the next period. Unless they 
have perfect information about the risk type of individuals, the insurers will only be 
able to categorize them into risk groups, which, even though with improved propor-
tions, still contain individuals of both low and high risk types.
18 To each risk group in-
surers then may offer a pair of self-selecting contracts. Properly the time lag, related to 
the collection of data, should be taken into account in a two-period model. But here no 
commitment on either side is assumed. Since insurers revise the whole contract set in 
each period, the consideration of the second period only is sufficient.  
Except for the freedom of insureds to determine the quantity or quality of information, 
this setup to a great extent reflects the contract structure of the US insurer Progressive. 
Besides conventional automobile insurance contracts Progressive also offers the so-
called TripSense contract.
19 It stipulates the installation of a monitoring device into the 
car, which traces and stores the chronology and duration of drives, mileage, accelera-
tion, braking and speed.  Insureds are provided with various tools, with which they can 
afterwards evaluate their driving history and calculate the insurance premium corre-
sponding to their individual risk. Depending on the performance during the particular 
period individuals can then decide if to upload the collected data to the insurer. Based 
on this information the insurer calculates the insurance premium and applies it to the 
next policy term.  
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Figure 1: time structure 
Low risks: In order to keep things as simple as possible, the strong assumption is made, 
that there is no classification risk for low risks, i.e. for any level of information, which 
is disclosed in equilibrium, low risks will be classified into a good risk group (G) with 
certainty. In this regard the assumption about the nature of information resembles the 
                                                 
18 See Hoy (1982) for an illustration of imperfect risk categorization. 
19 See https://tripsense.progressive.com/home.aspx for further information. - 9 - 
notion by Taylor (2004) of searching for “bad news” since the “probability of a false 
negative is zero”, i.e., the probability of a low risk driver, disclosing some information 
i, to be mistakenly taken for a high risk driver by the insurer and classified into a bad 
risk group (B) is zero. This is equivalent to the assumption that low risks’ driving style 
is careful and faultless all the time, so that for any i they reveal there will be no evi-
dence which could make insurers suspect a high risk behind the insured.  
High risks: As was mentioned above, all high risk individuals have an identical prob-
ability of loss 
H p , i.e. their driving style is on average worse than that of low risks. 
Nevertheless, in a given period of time the driving experience of high risks may differ – 
not only concerning the realization of the loss state, but also their driving performance 
on the whole.  
Unlike in the case of low risks it seems reasonable to assume that the detection of high 
risks’ bad driving style and driving mistakes in their records is facilitated by an increas-
ing temporal comprehensiveness, greater scope and precision of the collected data. Con-
cerning the length of records this assumption is sustained by realizing that driving mis-
takes, which distinguish high risks from low risks, occur in specific situations and not 
all the time. Concerning the quality of information it is straightforward to assume that 
patterns of bad driving style become more distinct as the movement of the car or actions 
and reactions of the driver can be traced in more detail. It follows that the possibility for 
high risk insureds to choose the quantity or quality of information to reveal will allow 
them to mimic low risk driving to some extent. On the one hand high risks are able to 
cut out and conceal the time segments which testify for their bad driving style. Simi-
larly, they can filter some segments of careful driving out of their records and disclose 
only these to the insurer. On the other hand they can reduce the precision of the data and 
thus blur the patterns of driving style. The more information is delivered in equilibrium, 
the more difficult it becomes for high risks to mimic low risks. Specifically it is as-
sumed that for any given level of information i, which is to be disclosed in equilibrium, 
high risks will be able to mimic low risks only with a probability of (1 ) i − . Furthermore 
it is reasonable to assume that beforehand high risks do not know exactly how good the 
records of their driving performance will be in a particular spell of time. Thus, for a 
given level of information i in equilibrium, high risks, who take the information con-
tract in the beginning of the period, do not know if they will be able to mimic low risks 
in the end of this period. So (1 ) i −  is also from the perspective of high risks the ex ante 
probability to be able to do so. But then, in the end of the data collection period, high 
risks can review their own driving performance and, for a given level of information i 
in equilibrium, check if they are able to mimic low risks.  - 10 - 
4  Wilson-Myazaki-Spence Equilibrium 
Unlike the Rothschild/Stiglitz (1976) (RS) separating equilibrium, which entails zero 
profits for every single contract, the Wilson-Myazaki-Spence (WMS) equilibrium  (see 
Dionne/Doherty/Fombaron, 2000, 209-212) allows for cross-subsidization between risk 
types as long as on the whole insurers have nonnegative profits. With this concept there 
is an equilibrium even in those cases, in which the RS equilibrium does not exist.
20 
Contrary to the RS equilibrium, which assumes that firms follow pure Nash strategies 
when offering a menu of contracts
21, the WMS equilibrium is based on the assumption 
of anticipatory behavior, or that firms possess “Wilson foresight”. It implies that a firm 
will offer a new set of policies “only if it makes positive profits after the other firms 
have made the anticipated adjustments in their policy offers”
22, i.e. after the other firms 
have withdrawn those of their policies which have become unprofitable. According to 
this anticipatory behavior, a contract set is an equilibrium, when “there is no portfolio 
outside the equilibrium set that, if offered, would earn a non-negative profit even after 
the unprofitable portfolios in the original set have been withdrawn”
23. Which equilib-
rium will eventually result, depends on the particular proportions of risk types. If 
(1 ) /
RS qqδ −> , where 
RS δ  is the critical value for the proportion of high risks for a RS 
separating equilibrium to exist, there will be such an equilibrium with actuarially fair 
insurance premiums for both risk types. However, this RS equilibrium will be second-
best efficient, i.e. Pareto-optimal within the set of feasible allocations, only if 
(1 ) /
WMS qqδ −>, where 
WMS δ  is itself larger than 
RS δ .
24 Otherwise - even if a RS equi-
librium exists,  (1 )/
WMS RS qq δ δ >− >  - welfare can be improved with low risks subsi-
dizing high risks, so that a WMS equilibrium will result
25. Below different settings will 
be examined depending on the proportions of risk types before and after the offer of an 
information contract. 
                                                 
20 See for instance Dionne/Doherty/Fombaron (2000, 209-212). 
21 „Equilibrium […] is a set of policies which, if offered in the market, no firm has an incentive to 
change“, Wilson (1977, 169). 
22 Wilson (1977, 169). 
23 Crocker/Snow (1985, 213), see also Wilson (1977, 189). 
24 See Dionne/Doherty/Fombaron (2000, p. 210, 211) and also Crocker/Snow (1985, 213). 
25 See for instance Crocker/Snow (1985, 213). - 11 - 
4.1  Initial RS equilibrium 
Suppose that the proportion of high risks is sufficiently high, i.e. 
(1 ) /
WMS RS qqδ δ −>> , so that, before the monitoring technology is offered, the initial 
equilibrium contracts are the RS no-subsidy separating contracts. In Figure 2 these con-
tracts are depicted as 
HK C  for high risks and 
LA C  for low risks. The axes of the prefer-
ence diagram represent the net wealth in both states of nature. Point N  represents the 
wealth position without insurance, where WL −  (W ) is the net wealth if an accident 
(no accident) occurs. As can be seen, both contracts lie on the respective zero-profits 
lines, where 
j π  has a slope of  (1 )/
j j p p −−
26, { , } j LH ∈ . Thus both risk types pay 
actuarially fair premiums. But while high risks receive full insurance (
HK C  lies on the 
certainty line), low risks get less than full coverage. Compared to a situation with sym-
metric information (















Figure 2: initial RS equilibrium 
The acceptance of a monitoring technology will put low risks into the position to “sig-
nal” their type to the insurer. By assumption, their driving style is always careful, so 
that the more information they reveal, the more they will be able to distinguish from 
high risks, since the more difficult it becomes for high risks to mimic them. Hence, 
                                                 
26 The slope of the iso-profit line is found by totally differentiating the expected profits 
() ( 1 )( ) jj pA p N A ππ π =⋅ + − , by which  () / ( ) ( 1 ) / jj dAdN A p p ππ =− − . - 12 - 
more information revealed will result in low risks approaching complete insurance cov-
erage. Insofar information has a value in the sense that it Pareto-improves welfare
27. 
However, if low risks accept an information contract, their decision about the quantity 
of information will be a trade-off between the positive effect of reducing information 
asymmetry and the negative effect of losing privacy. In an analogous manner, for high 
risks disclosing information the trade off will be between the chance of being able to 
mimic low risks and thus of getting more favorable contract conditions and, as with low 
risks, the costs of losing privacy.  
For the time being it will be assumed that both low and high risks accept the informa-
tion contract  ) ( ) ), ( (
LA L L C EU i i C EV >  and  ) ( ) ), ( (
HK H H C EU i i C EV > . This will be 
verified later.
28  
As was mentioned above, depending on the recorded driving performance during the 
collection of data, insureds who took the information contract, decide in the end of the 
period if and how much information to disclose.  
Proposition 1: Suppose that both low risk and high risk individuals took an information 
contract and that in equilibrium low risks disclose  *0 i > . Then, (i) if high risks, who 
are able to mimic low risks at this level of information, reveal any information, they 
will also disclose  *
H ii = ; (ii) and high risks who are not able to mimic low risks at this 
level of information, will not disclose any information,  0
H i = . 
Proof:  i) suppose that in the end of the data collection period a high risk individual is 
able to mimic the low risks at the equilibrium quantity of information  * i  and 
0*
H ii <<. The insurer knows, that low risks disclose exactly  * i  in equilibrium. For an 
individual disclosing less than  * i , the insurer will know that it is a high risk. But then 
the high risk can just as well withhold the information and save unnecessary privacy 
costs. For  *
H ii > , even if a high risk is able to mimic low risks at a higher level of in-
formation than the equilibrium one, it is useless to do so. Here too the insurer will know 
that a low risk reveals exactly  * i  in equilibrium, so that an individual disclosing more 
than that will be identified as a high risk. So, if a high risk, which is able to mimic low 
risks, reveals any information, he will reveal  *
H ii = . 
                                                 
27 According to Fagart/Fombaron (2003, 6) “information has some value if a contract based on the addi-
tional information dominates in a Pareto sense any contract ignoring [the] information”. 
28 See proposition 4 for low risks and proposition 5 for high risks. - 13 - 
ii) suppose that a high risk individual is not able to mimic the low risks at the equilib-
rium information level  * i  and  *
H ii < . By the same argument as before it is useless to 
reveal any information. For  *
H ii >  the argument applies even more so. Hence, a high 
risk, which is not able to mimic low risks, will not reveal any information  0
H i = . ⁭ 
Corollary 1: There is no such scenario, that high risks disclose information, while at 
the same time low risks disclose no information.  
Proof: Suppose low risks reveal  *0 i =  in equilibrium. From the proof of proposition 1 
it follows that high risks also reveal  0
H i = .  
If no one reveals information, actually nothing will change compared to the to the initial 
equilibrium and the result would be the same as if both risk types had rejected the in-
formation contracts from the onset. The conditions for corner solutions  *0 i =  and 
*1 i =  will be examined later, but first low risks revealing 0* 1 i < <  will be considered.  
Thus, for any  * i (0,1) ∈  submitted by low risks in equilibrium, high risks will either 
disclose *
H ii =  or  0
H i = . Hence, from the viewpoint of the insurer, in the end of the 
data collection period, there will be two groups of insureds – one group disclosing in-
formation and the other group disclosing no information. Since low risks will be in the 
group disclosing information, it will be called the good risk group (G). The group of 
insureds who reveal no information, will be called the bad risk group (B) and as it has 
already been argued, it will contain no low risks,  0 = B q . In case that high risks never 
disclose information, no matter if they are ex post able to mimic low risks or not, the 
good risk group (G) will consist only of low risks, so that the insurer can offer to them 
the first-best contract with full insurance 
LK C . As shall be seen later, this scenario will 
never occur.
29 In case that high risks, which are ex post able to mimic low risks at the 
equilibrium information level  * i , do reveal this quantity of information, from the view-
point of the insurer the proportions of risk types in both risk groups will be as follows. 
The bad risk group (B) will consist only of high risks (1 ) 1 B q − = , namely of those, 
whose records are unsuited to mimic low risks. The good risk group (G) will consist of 
all low risks and those of the high risks, which ex post discover their ability to mimic 
low risks. Hence, the proportions for this group will be 
( 1 * )[ ( 1* ) ( 1 ) ] / [ ( 1* ) ( 1 ) ] G qi q i q q −= − ⋅ − − ⋅ − +  for high risks and 
*/ [ ( 1 * ) ( 1 )] G qq i q q =− ⋅ − +  for low risks. The implications of this reasoning can be 
seen graphically in Figure 2. The pooling zero-profit line for the initial RS equilibrium 
                                                 
29 See proposition 5. - 14 - 
is presented by 
P π . It has a slope of  (1 )/
P P p p −− , where  (1 )
P HL p qp q p = −⋅ + ⋅  is 
the average probability of accident of all individuals in the population. The pooling 
zero-profit line for the good risk group is denoted by 
G π . It has a slope of   
[1 ( *)]/ ( *) p ip i −− , where  
(1 *) (1 )
(* )
(1 *) (1 ) (1 *) (1 )
H L iq q
p ip p
iq q iq q
−⋅ −
=⋅ +⋅
−⋅ −+ −⋅ −+
  
is the average probability of accident for the good risk group (G). As can be seen, it is 
steeper than the initial one, since the proportion of high risks in this group is smaller 
than the proportion of high risks in the population. At  *0 i =  
G π  coincides with 
P π , so 
that the resulting information contracts coincide with the initial RS equilibrium con-
tracts. At   *1 i =  
G π  coincides with  
L π : the good risk group will contain low risks 
only, since by assumption the probability for high risks to mimic low risks, when com-
plete information is revealed, is zero. In this case the resulting contract is the first-best 
for low risks 
LK C . For  * i   (0,1) ∈  larger equilibrium quantity of information will imply 
a smaller proportion of high risks in this group, hence a steeper slope of 
G π . For the 
equilibrium contracts in this group (G) it again depends on the proportions of risk types, 
which equilibrium will persist. Suppose that the quantity of information  ' i  (0,1) ∈  is 
chosen by low risks, such that the proportion of high risks in this group is still larger 
than the critical value 
WMS δ , i.e. (1 ') / ' [(1 ') (1 )]/
WMS
GG qq i q q δ −= − ⋅ − > . Then the RS 
equilibrium will still be second best efficient, so that, within this group (G), the optimal 
contracts will be again 
HK C  and 
LA C . But individuals will anticipate this result when 
considering the revelation of information. If there is no change in the contract set after 
the revelation of data, it makes no use revealing any information at all. Hence, low risks 
will either disclose no information  *0 i = , or they will disclose a level of information 
large enough  *' ii >  to promote a WMS equilibrium, where  * i  is chosen such, that 
(1 *) / * [(1 *) (1 )]/
WMS
GG qq i q q δ −= − ⋅ − <  holds. In this case, in equilibrium the WMS 
cross-subsidizing contracts will result, which are depicted in Figure 2 as 
* H C  for high 
risks and 
* L C  for low risks. A first reasonable conjecture is, that it might be optimal for 
low risks not to reveal any information  *0 i = , when the proportion of high risks in the 
population is exorbitantly large and the amount of information, which would be neces-
sary to entail a WMS-cross subsidizing equilibrium, would incur too much costs in or-
der for that information to be worth revealing.  
Proposition 2: Suppose that in equilibrium  *0 i > . High risks, which do not disclose 
any information in equilibrium, will be offered 
HK C .  - 15 - 
Proof: This is a direct consequence of the fact that for the bad risk group (B) it holds 
that  1 ) 1 ( = − B q , i.e. 
WMS
B B q q δ > − / ) 1 ( , by which the initial RS equilibrium results. 
Since there are only high risks in this group, the only contract, which will be offered 
within this group will be 
HK C . The intuition for this result is as follows. As shown by 
Rothschild/Stiglitz (1976) a contract for high risks with only partial insurance cannot be 
optimal.
30 Hence, the contract offered to individuals in the bad risk group must lie on 
the certainty line. Suppose that insurers offer a contract  '
HK C  to the northeast of 
HK C , 
having a loss with this particular contract. It will imply that, in order for the insurers to 
earn zero profits on the whole portfolio of contracts, the insureds in the good risk group 
have to subsidize insureds in the bad risk group. If this is an equilibrium, according to 
the definition of a WMS equilibrium, there must not exist another contract set outside 
this equilibrium, that if offered, would earn a non-negative profit even after the unprof-
itable portfolios in the original set have been withdrawn.  But consider an insurer offer-
ing the menu 
HK C , 
* H C , 
* L C  for instance. Since with this menu, insureds in the good 
risk group (G) do not have to pay a subsidy, they will prefer it (remember, it was as-
sumed that there is no commitment) and the insurers still offering  '
HK C  will incur a 
loss and will have to withdraw it. Hence,  '
HK C  cannot constitute an equilibrium. The 
same arguments apply to the case that a contract is offered to high risks, which lies to 
the southwest of 
HK C . Only the menu of contracts 
HK C , 
* H C , 
* L C  satisfies the defini-
tion of a WMS equilibrium.  
Now suppose, that high risks rejected the information contract from the outset. Given 
that low risks have accepted it and reveal  *0 i >  in equilibrium, the insurer will imme-
diately recognize high risks as such. Since there is no commitment, he will offer in the 
second period 
HK C  to them. ⁭ 
4.2  Optimization Problem 
Formally the optimal contracts 
* H C , 
* L C  in Figure 2 are found by maximizing the ex-
pected utility of low risks under the zero-profit constraint of the insurer and self-




max ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
HL L
LL L L L
rdr i
p uW L r d p uW r gi ⋅− − + + − ⋅− − 
The indemnity for high risks 
H d  as a choice variable has been omitted here, since it has 
already been shown, for instance by Crocker/Snow (1985, 210), that the contract result-
                                                 
30 In the case of a monopolistic market this is shown by Stiglitz (1977, 418-419). 
31 See Crocker/Snow (1985) for a formal analysis of the WMS equilibrium. - 16 - 
ing for high risks implies complete insurance,  *
H dL = .
32 Besides that the program de-
termines the equilibrium contracts 
* (* ,* )
LL L Cd r =  and 
* (, * )
HH CL r = , low risks also 
decide, how much information to reveal in equilibrium. More information will increase 
the costs related to the loss of privacy. But it will also decrease the proportion of high 
risks in the good risk group and result in more insurance coverage for low risks. Still, as 
long as  *1 i < , insurers cannot distinguish high risks from low risks in the group reveal-
ing information, so that a self-selection constraint is needed to assure that high risks 
choose the contract designed for them. 
(2) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
H HL L H L uW r p uW L r d p uW r − ≥ ⋅− − + + −⋅−  
From Proposition 2 it follows that in equilibrium the insurers have to earn zero profits 
within each risk group. For group G this means that the zero-profit constraint  
(3) 
(1 ) (1 )
() () 0
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
HH LL L iq q
rp L rp d
iq q iq q
−⋅−
⋅−⋅ + ⋅− ⋅≥
−⋅− + −⋅− +
 
must hold. Since by construction,  1 i ≤ , the optimization is also subject to  
(4)  10 i −≥  
The solution to this problem can be found using the Kuhn-Tucker Conditions (see sec-
tion A1 of the appendix).  
For * (0,1) i ∈  it is straightforward to show, that both the self-selection constraint (2) as 
well as the zero-profit constraint (3) are active, and in addition two more equalities 
(necessary conditions) hold in the maximum: 
(5)  
'( *) '( * *) '( *) (1 )(1 *) (1 )
'( *) '( * *) ( )
HL L L LL
LL LH L
uW r uW L r d uW r qi p p
qu W r u W L r d p p
⎡⎤ −⋅ − − +−− −− −⋅ ⎣⎦ =⋅
−⋅ − −+ −
 
(6)  ( 1 )' ( * )' ( * ) ( 1 ) ( * )
'( *)
(1 ) '( *) (1 *) (1 ) (1 ) '( *)
LL H H H
LH HL
pu W r u W r qpL r
gi
qp u W r i q p u W r
−⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅⋅ −
=
⋅− ⋅ − +− ⋅− ⋅− ⋅ −
 
The first equality (5) is analogous to the usual optimality condition for a WMS equilib-
rium
33, except that here the proportion of high risks depends on the amount of informa-
tion  * i , which is revealed in equilibrium. The second equality (6) states that the mar-
ginal disutility of revealing information must be equal to the marginal utility of doing 
                                                 
32 See also Spence (1978, 434). 
33 See Rothschild/Stiglitz (1976, 645). - 17 - 
so. From a normative point of view it is interesting to check the conditions, under which 
it is optimal for low risks, once they have accepted the information contract, to reveal 
complete information. In section A2 of the appendix it is shown that a sufficient condi-
tion for  *1 i =  is 
(7) 
(1 )
'(1) '( ) ( )
LH L q
gu W p L L p p
q
−
≤⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − .  
As can be seen, the larger the right hand-side of this inequality, the more probable is it 
that it is satisfied. In other words, the higher the monetary value of the loss, which 
might occur, the larger the difference between the probabilities of accident of low risks 
compared to high risks, the larger the proportion of high risks in the population and the 
larger the marginal utility of net wealth, the more is it probable that low risks will dis-
close complete information in equilibrium.  
A direct result of the Kuhn-Tucker Conditions, which is proved in section A3 of the 
appendix, is stated in 
Proposition 3: For the good risk group (G) the RS no-subsidy equilibrium contracts, 
ii rp L =⋅ ,  {,} iH L ∈ ,  result if and only if  *0 i = . 
This is a restatement of the above reasoning that, if expected utility of low risks is maxi-
mized by keeping the initial RS contracts, then it is no use revealing any information, 
and, the other way round, information is revealed only if it entails cross-subsidizing 
contracts that lead to some benefits to balance the disutility from losing privacy.  
In order to get a better understanding of what factors determine the size of  ) 1 , 0 ( *∈ i , it 
seems reasonable to use an alternative specification for the maximization problem (1)-
(4). The optimal contracts 
* H C  and 
* L C  for group G can also be found by means of the 
optimal subsidy problem, which was first used by Rothschild/Stiglitz (1976, 644). In 
equilibrium high risks receive a subsidy s, so that the effective insurance premium for 
high risks is  *
HH K H rrs p L s = −= ⋅−. Low risks pay a tax t in order to subsidize high 
risks, so that  * *
LL L L rr t p dt = += ⋅ +. In order for the zero-profit constraint to be satis-
fied, it must hold, that the tax paid by all low risks in the good risk group has to cover 
the subsidy paid to all high risks in this group,  
(8) 




=⋅ ,  0 s ≥ . 
The equilibrium contract set is found by choosing 
L d , i, and s to maximize - 18 - 
(9)   max ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
LL L L pu A p u N A g i ⋅+ − ⋅ −  
(10) s.t.  ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
H HL H L uW p L s p uA p uN A −⋅ + ≥⋅ + − ⋅  
(11)   10 i − ≥ , 
where (1 )
LL L AW L pdt =− + − ⋅−  is the net wealth pertaining to contract 
* L C  in case 
that an accident occurs, and 
LL L NA W p d t = −⋅−  is the no-accident net wealth with 
this contract.  
After solving it (see section A4 of the appendix), one gets, that the self-selection con-
straint (10) is binding and the following optimality conditions for  *0 i > : 
(12) 
(1 *) (1 ) '( ) [ '( ) '( )] (1 )
'( ) '( )
H LL L L
LL H L
iq u W p L s u A u N A pp
qu A u N A p p





(1 ) '( ) '( )
'( *) ( )
(1 ) '( ) (1 ) '( )
LL
HL
H LL H L L
qu A u N A
gi s p p
qp p u A pp u N A
−⋅
=⋅ − ⋅ ⋅
⋅− ⋅ −− ⋅ ⋅
. 
Equation (12) is identical to (5) and (13) provides an alternative way compared to (6) to 
specify the marginal utility of revealing information. Given that low risks prefer the 
information contract to the no-subsidy RS contract, the equilibrium quantity of informa-
tion is likely to be larger, when the right hand side of (12) (of (13)) is smaller (larger). 
* i  is larger, when (i) the difference between the probabilities of accident of the risk 
types is large, (ii) the proportion of high risks in the population is large, (iii) the equilib-
rium subsidy per high risk is large, (iv) the risk-aversion of insureds is low, i.e. the dif-
ference [ '( ) '( )]
LL uA uN A −  is small. These conditions are characterized by Rothschild/ 
Stiglitz (1976, 637) in their analysis of the non-existence of a RS no-subsidy equilib-
rium. According to the authors, the more these conditions apply, the higher are the 
“costs of pooling” and the lower are the “costs of separating” from the viewpoint of low 
risks, and hence, the more likely is it, that, as a result, a no-subsidy RS equilibrium will 
persist.
34 Particularly, they show that the sufficient condition for a RS equilibrium to be 
second-best efficient is  
                                                 
34 Higher costs of pooling arise, when there are many high risks to be subsidized (ii), or the subsidy per 
high risk is large (i), (iii). Separating costs are related to the risk-aversion (iv) of insureds and hence 
to the “individual’s inability to obtain complete insurance”, Rothschild/Stiglitz (1976, 637). - 19 - 
(1 ) '( ) [ '( ) '( )] (1 )
'( ) '( )
H LL L L
LL H L
qu W p L s u Au N A p p
qu A u N Ap p
−− ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ −
>⋅
⋅−
, where  0 s = . The right 
hand side of this inequality is equal to 
WMS δ .
35  
From all said it follows that, once low risks find it optimal to reveal a positive level of 
information, then the more likely it is for a RS no-subsidy equilibrium to result at a 
given level of information, the more it pays for low risks to reveal an even higher level 
of information and to create a WMS cross-subsidizing equilibrium. The reasoning is as 
follows: when the proportion of high risks in the population is high, then the benefit of 
low risks from reducing the proportion of high risks in the good risk group (G) is also 
larger. Hoy (1982, 335) has shown, that a decreasing proportion of high risks in a par-
ticular categorization group leads to an increase of the per capita subsidy in this group. 
So a higher equilibrium s in (13) corresponds to a smaller proportion of high risks in 
the good risk group (G) and hence, to a greater level of coverage for low risks. The 
smaller the proportion of high risks in the good risk group, which results from the reve-
lation of information, the more advantageous it will be for low risks to disclose that 
information. With strongly differing probabilities of accident of both risk types, a RS 
no-subsidy equilibrium will entail less coverage for low risks than with weakly differing 
probabilities of accident
36. Hence, with strongly differing probabilities of accident the 
benefit of low risks from “signaling” their risk type to the insurer by revealing informa-
tion will be greater. The same argument applies to lower risk-aversion, which also en-
tails less coverage in a RS no-subsidy equilibrium.  
A question, which has not been answered yet, is, when the equilibrium level of informa-
tion that low risks choose will be positive, i.e. when the monitoring technology will be 
accepted by insureds. Intuitively this will be the case, if the disutility from revealing 
information is not too large or, alternatively, if for a given disutility function the propor-
tion of high risks in the population is not too large. This is stated in 
Proposition 4: (i) low risks will never reveal a quantity of information 
WMS i i ≤ < * 0 , 
where 
WMS i  is the minimum level of information necessary to trigger a WMS cross-
                                                 
35 See Rothschild/Stiglitz (1976, 645) and also Crocker/Snow (1985, 212-215). 
36 Consider the self-selecting constraint (12), which is active in equilibrium. Holding everything else 
constant, a marginal increase of the probability accident of high risks 
H H p p > '  will cause the left 
hand side to decrease and the right hand side to increase. Hence, for the equation to hold with  '
H p , 
it must be that the net wealth in the state of accident must decrease and the net wealth in the no-
accident state must increase, which implies lower coverage.  - 20 - 
subsidizing equilibrium. (ii) low risks will accept the information contract, i.e. 
0 * > >
WMS i i , if  and only if for some 
WMS i i > ≥ 1 , it holds  
) ( ) ( )) ( (










Proof:  (i) As stated above, it is no use for low risks revealing information, if it is not 
sufficient to trigger a WMS equilibrium. For a set of parameters 
L p , 
H p ,  L, W  and 
utility function  ) (w u , let 
WMS δ  be the critical ratio of high risk individuals to low risk 
individuals for a WMS cross-subsidizing equilibrium to be second-best efficient. Start-
ing from an initial RS no-subsidy equilibrium is equivalent to 
WMS WMS WMS q q q q δ = − > − / ) 1 ( / ) 1 (.  L e t   0 >
WMS i  be the minimum level of informa-
tion, which is just necessary to trigger a WMS cross-subsidizing equilibrium, i.e. 
WMS WMS q i q δ = − ⋅ − / ) 1 ( ) 1 (.   
For any 
WMS i i < < 0 , it holds that 
WMS q i q δ > − ⋅ − / ) 1 ( ) 1 ( . In this case the RS no-
subsidy contract will be second best-efficient. By proposition 3 low risks reject the in-
formation contract,  0 * = i . Hence it will never be optimal to reveal 
WMS i i < < * 0 . 
Suppose that, low risks reveal  
WMS i . Since  0 >
WMS i  is the minimum level of informa-
tion sufficient to trigger a WMS equilibrium, it holds that 
) ( )) ( (
LA L WMS L L C EU i C EU = , but at the same time  0 ) ( >
WMS i g . Hence, at this level of 
information the expected utility from the information contract is strictly less than the 
expected utility from the conventional contract, 
) ( ) ( )) ( (
LA L WMS WMS L L C EU i g i C EU < − . Hence it will never be optimal for low risks to 
reveal 
WMS i i = * . 
(ii) From (i), it follows that, if low risks reveal any information,  0 * > i , it must be that 
] 1 , ( *
WMS i i ∈ . For low risks to reveal  ] 1 , ( *
WMS i i ∈ , it must hold that 
) ( *) ( ) (




























 for  1 * = i ).  Since both 
)) ( ( i C EU
L  and  ) (i g  are increasing in i, this will apply, if and only if there is some 
WMS i i > , for which  ) ( ) ( )) ( (










As can be seen, 
WMS i  is increasing in  q q / ) 1 ( − . Due to the assumption that  0 ) ( ' ' > i g  
for  0 > i , ) ( '
WMS i g  is increasing 
WMS i , and hence it is increasing in  q q / ) 1 ( − . This ef-
fect is amplified, if the size of  ) ( ' ' i g  for any i is large. Thus, a larger proportion of high - 21 - 
risks in the population or a larger disutility from revealing a given level of information 
decrease the probability, that the conditions (ii) for low risks to reveal information are 
satisfied, i.e. low risks are more likely to reject the information contract. But if they 
accept it, then a larger proportion of high risks in the population or larger disutility from 
revealing information imply a greater quantity of information revealed in equilibrium 
(see equations (12) and (13)). 
Up to now it was taken for given, that high risks, who ex post discover the ability to 
mimic low risks, will do so and hence, that ex ante high risks will just as well accept the 
information contract. This assumption will now be proved in   
Proposition 5: Given that it is optimal for low risks to reveal  * (0,1) i ∈ , then high risks 
(i) will also accept the information contract (ii) they will also reveal  * i , if they find out, 
that they are able to mimic low risks, (iii) they will also be better off choosing the in-
formation contract compared to the initial RS equilibrium. 
Proof: Low risks choosing  *( 0 , 1 ) i ∈  implies that low risks prefer the information con-
tract to the conventional RS contract, i.e.  ) 0 , ( *) , (
* LA L L L C EV i C EV >  ⇔  
) ( *) ( ) (
* LA L L L C EU i g C EU > − ⇔  
  > − − ⋅ − + + − − ⋅ *) ( *) ( ) 1 ( *) * ( i g r W u p d r L W u p
L L L L L
 ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
LA L LA LA L r W u p d r L W u p − ⋅ − + + − − ⋅   
⇔  [( * * ) ( ) ] ( * )
LL L L A L A pu WL r d u WL r d g i ⋅− − + − − − +−>
 (1 ) [ ( ) ( *)]
LL AL pu W r u W r −⋅ −− −  
As 
H L p p >  and (1 ) (1 )
H L p p −< − ,  it follows that  
[( * * ) ( ) ] ( * )
HL L L A L A pu W L r d u W L r d g i ⋅− − + − − − +−>
 (1 ) [ ( ) ( *)]
HL AL pu W r u W r −⋅ −−−  
⇔  (* ) ( * ) ( )
H LH L A EU C g i EU C −> . But from the self-selection constraint (2), we 
know that  ( *) ( *)
HH HL EU C EU C =  and for the initial RS equilibrium it must also hold 
that ( ) ( )
H HK H LA EU C EU C = . Hence  
(14) 
* ()( * ) ()
H HH H K EU C g i EU C −>  
This inequality states that, if high risks have accepted the information contract in the 
beginning of the data collection period and they find out in the end of that period, that 
they are able to mimic low risks with the equilibrium quantity of information  * i , then - 22 - 
their expected utility of doing so will be strictly larger than the expected utility of with-
holding the collected information (ii). 
(i) For the decision, which contract to accept, high risks compare the ex ante expected 
utility of the information contract with the ex ante expected utility of the conventional 
contract 
HK C . They will prefer the information contract, if  
(15) 
* (1 *) ( ) * ( ) (1 *) ( *) ( )
H HH H K H H K i E UC iE UC i g i E UC −⋅ + ⋅ − −⋅ >  
If they accept the information contract, high risks know, that in the end of the data col-
lection period they will be able to mimic low risks only with a probability of (1 *) i − . In 
this case they will incur the costs of losing privacy  (* ) gi  and get the contract  *
H C . 
With probability  * i  they will not be able to mimic low risks with the equilibrium quan-
tity of information  * i  and, as was shown, in this case they reveal no information 
(proposition 1) and get the contract 
HK C  (proposition 2). The other way round, keeping 
the conventional contract implies getting 
HK C  with certainty. After some transformation 
it can be seen, that inequality (15) is equivalent to inequality (14), which is always satis-
fied. Thus, given that it is optimal for low risks to disclose  * (0,1) i ∈ , high risks will 
also accept the information contract.  
(iii) the statement follows directly from (15) which is equivalent to 
0 ) 0 , ( *) , (
* > −
HK H H H C EV i C EV .⁭  
4.3  Welfare Effects  
As shall be seen, especially in section 4.4, the assumption, that there is no commitment 
on either side will be crucial for the welfare effects.  
In case that it is optimal for low risks not to reveal any information,  0 * = i , which is 
equivalent to low risks’ rejecting the information contract, there will be no change to 
either risk type compared to the initial equilibrium.   
In case that it is optimal for low risks to reveal  *1 i = , high risks with certainty will not 
be able to mimic low risks at this quantity of information. Since they anticipate this re-
sult at the decision stage, they might just as well reject the information contract. In equi-
librium the first-best contracts 
HK C  and 
LK C  will persist in the second period. For high 
risks nothing will have changed through the offer of a monitoring technology, low risks 
will get full insurance. Even though they suffer the costs of losing privacy  (1) g , the fact 
that their expected utility is maximized at  *1 i =  implies that these costs are outweighed 
by the positive effect of the transition to full insurance. So, on the whole, the offer of 
the monitoring technology will lead to a Pareto-improvement of welfare. - 23 - 
In case that it is optimal for low risks to reveal  * (0,1) i ∈ , it was shown above, that high 
risks will also accept the information contract and reveal  * i , if they are able to mimic 
low risks at this quantity of information, and reveal no information in case that they are 
not able to mimic low risks. In the second period insurers will offer the contract menu 
HK C , 
* H C  and 
* L C . For high risks, which are categorized in the bad risk group (B), 
nothing will change compared to the initial contract. Considering only the contractual 
expected utility from the equilibrium information contracts (
* H C , 
* L C ) in the good risk 
group (G), both low risks and high risks, which are categorized in this group, are better 
off than with the former conventional contract set (
HK C , 
LK C )
37: although low risks 
have to pay a subsidy to high risks, on the whole, because of the higher coverage, their 
expected utility increases compared to the initial contract 
LA C . High risks with 
* H C  are 
better off, since they have to pay less than fair premium. For their decision problem, 
how much information to reveal, low risks consider also the costs of losing privacy, and 
the choice of an equilibrium level of information  *( 0 , 1 ) i ∈  implies that the costs are 
outweighed by the positive effect of revealing information also in this case. As was 
shown in proposition 5 (14), this also applies to high risks in the good risk group (G). 
Low risks get the contract 
* L C  with certainty, so that ex ante their expected utility from 
the information contract is larger than the expected utility from the former conventional 
contract 
LA C . From an ex ante point of view high risks also have a larger expected util-
ity from the information contract compared to the former conventional contract 
HK C  
(see (15)). Therefore, the offer of a monitoring technology leads to a Pareto-type im-
provement of welfare both from an ex post as well as from an ex ante point of view.
38 
It can be followed from the above results, that the all-or-nothing nature of the voluntary 
monitoring, which is currently offered by some insurers, can be efficient only in case 
that it is optimal for individuals to reveal no ( 0 * = i ) or complete ( *1 i = ) information. 
Otherwise, offering insureds a monitoring technology with fixed quantity of information 
will not be efficient.  
4.4  Initial WMS equilibrium 
Now suppose that the proportion of high risks is smaller than the critical value for sec-
ond-best efficiency of a RS equilibrium, (1 )/
WMS qqδ −<. Thus, before insurers offer a 
monitoring technology, a WMS cross-subsidizing equilibrium persists
39. In Figure 3  
                                                 
37 See Hoy (1982, 331, 335). 
38 Recall, high risks, who cannot mimic low risks, do not submit information and so do not incur any 
privacy costs.  
39 See Hoy (1982, 334). - 24 - 
the equilibrium conventional contracts are denoted by 
HS C  for high risks and 
LS C  for 
low risks. The argumentation is very similar to that in the last sections. Since proposi-
tions 1 to 3 were not related to the specific type of initial equilibrium, they apply also in 
this case. As shown below, proposition 4 is redundant for an initial WMS equilibrium. 


















Figure 3: initial WMS cross-subsidizing equilibrium 
 
By proposition 1, if the information contracts are accepted in equilibrium and informa-
tion is disclosed at all, it will be  * i  regardless of the risk type revealing that informa-
tion. Again we will first assume that both low risks and high risks accept the informa-
tion contract, and high risks who ex post discover that they are able to mimic low risks, 
indeed reveal the equilibrium information quantity  * i . This will be verified in proposi-
tion 6. By proposition 1 high risks, who are not able to mimic low risks, will not reveal 
any information and by proposition 2 they will be recognized as high risks by insurers 
and will be offered 
HK C  for the second period. Hence, the reasoning is identical to the 
case of initial RS equilibrium and the optimal contracts for the good risk group can be 
found formally by solving the maximization problem (1) to (4). By proposition 3 the 
revealed information for low risks can be zero, if and only if the equilibrium premiums 
for both risk types are actuarially fair. This is the crucial point for the case of an initial - 25 - 
WMS cross-subsidizing equilibrium. As it is characterized by (1 )/
WMS qqδ −<, actuari-
ally fair premiums will never result in equilibrium, not even for  *0 i = . Hence, from 
proposition 3 it directly follows that 
Corollary 2: If the initial equilibrium is the WMS cross-subsidizing one, low risks will 
always accept the information contract and the equilibrium quantity of information will 
always be positive  *0 i > .  
Keeping in mind, that high risks, who accept the information contract, might end up 
with 
HK C  instead of holding the initial subsidized contract 
HS C , it is not as straightfor-
ward as in the last sections to see, that they will also accept the information contract. 
But this is proved in 
Proposition 6: In case that it is optimal for low risks to reveal  *1 i < , high risks (i) will 
also accept the information contract and (ii) they will also reveal  * i , if they find out ex 
post that they are able to mimic low risks. 
The formal proof, which is analogous to the proof of proposition 5, is found in section 
A5 of the appendix. But the intuition is very simple and based on the assumption that 
there is no commitment on the part of the insurers. As soon as insurers update their be-
liefs concerning the risk type of the insureds, they adjust the contract set to be offered 
the next period. No matter if insureds have rejected the contract, or if they do not reveal 
any information after having accepted it, given that low risks reveal  *0 i >  in equilib-
rium, high risks, who do not reveal  * i , will immediately be identified as such and will 
be offered 
HK C . Since by accepting the information contract, high risks have the chance 
of being able to mimic low risks, they will do so. 
Concerning the welfare effects of offering an optional information contract to insureds, 
the results differ from those in section 4.3. As was shown, with initial WMS equil-
librium it is always optimal for low risks to reveal non-zero quantity of information, 
*0 i > , and thus the information contracts will always be accepted. As in section 4.3, 
being categorized into the good risk group (G) makes low risks better off than with the 
former conventional contract 
LS C .
40 Ex ante the contractual expected utility of low risks 
from the information contract is equivalent to getting 
* L C  with certainty, so that low 
risks are better off with the information contract than with the former conventional con-
tract. High risks being categorized into the good risk group (and getting 
* H C ) are better 
                                                 
40 The welfare implications of categorization when the initial equilibrium is pooling, respectively cross-
subsidizing are illustrated by Hoy  (1982, 329, 335). - 26 - 
off than with 
HS C  (see (A.13) in the appendix). But if they are ex post unable to mimic 
low risks, they get 
HK C , which makes them worse off compared to the original contract. 
So, ex ante high risks face a lottery over the contracts 
* H C  and 
HK C . The question, if 
the offer of a monitoring technology improves their welfare from an ex ante point of 
view, can be answered after comparing the ex ante expected utility from the lottery   
(16) 
* ( ( *), *) (1 *) ( ) * ( ) (1 *) ( *)
HH H H H K EV C i i i EU C i EU C i g i =− ⋅ +⋅ −− ⋅   
with the expected utility from the original contract  ( )
H HS EU C . 
As is shown in section A6 of the appendix, unless the individuals’ coefficient of abso-
lute risk aversion is sufficiently small, it holds that: 
(17) ( ( *), *) ( )
H HH S EV C i i EU C < , for all  *(0,1] i  
Hence, if the initial equilibrium is a WMS cross subsidizing one, high risks will most 
probably be made worse off when a monitoring technology is offered. It is interesting to 
notice that, due to the assumption of no commitment, this result holds no matter if high 
risks accept or reject the information contract, i.e. the voluntary nature of the monitor-
ing technology cannot prevent from making high risks worse off.  
5  Conclusions  
The development of sophisticated monitoring technologies in recent years has allowed 
some automobile insurers to offer to their customers voluntary observation of driving in 
order to calculate their individual risk and insurance premiums. Thereby the adverse 
effects of information asymmetries, i.e. incomplete insurance, can be reduced. How-
ever, a challenge, which naturally arises with monitoring, is the loss of privacy.  
Focusing on the problem of adverse selection, this paper examines the implications of 
offering such monitoring technologies in a perfectly competitive insurance market with-
out commitment. At the same time the analysis incorporates the inherent costs related to 
the loss of privacy. The possibility is examined, that insureds not only have the choice 
between conventional contracts and contracts with monitoring, but that they also have 
the freedom to choose the quantity or quality of information they reveal to the insurer. 
This assumption is justified by the current efforts of engineering research to find tech-
nological solutions, which allow individuals to determine the accuracy and scope of the 
revealed data. When individuals are able to determine how much or which kind of in-
formation to reveal to the insurer, it is straightforward to assume, that high risk indi-- 27 - 
viduals will select those pieces of information, by which they can mimic low risk indi-
viduals.  
In this setting the incentives of individuals to reveal information, the factors which de-
termine their decision, the resulting equilibria and welfare effects are analyzed. The 
analysis is performed both for the case, that before the offer of a monitoring technology 
the conventional contracts, which persist in equilibrium, are the Rothschild/Stiglitz no-
subsidy contracts, and for the case that the initial contracts are the Wilson-Myazaki-
Spence cross-subsidizing contracts. It was shown that with an initial RS equilibrium, 
the information contracts might be rejected and that with an initial WMS equilibrium 
individuals will always accept the monitoring technology. It was also found that, once 
the information contracts are accepted, more information will be revealed in equilib-
rium, when from the viewpoint of low risk individuals the costs of pooling are high and 
the costs of separating are low. This presumes strongly differing probabilities of acci-
dent between risk types, a large proportion of high risks in the population and low risk 
aversion of individuals. It was shown that, a larger quantity of information revealed in 
equilibrium entails a higher coverage for low risks, i.e. a better allocation of risk from 
an efficiency point of view. The conditions were derived, under which it will be optimal 
for individuals to reveal complete information. In this case the resulting contracts in 
equilibrium will be those, which would result under symmetric information, i.e. the 
first-best ones. As a consequence, the offer of all-or-nothing monitoring options will not 
be efficient unless it is optimal for individuals either to reject the monitoring technology 
or to reveal complete information. Another result was that the welfare effects depend on 
the type of the initial equilibrium contracts. If the initial equilibrium contracts are the 
Rothschild/Stiglitz no-subsidy ones, the offer of a monitoring technology, if it is ac-
cepted, Pareto-improves welfare. In this case, from an ex ante point of view, both low 
risk individuals and high risk individuals are made better off through the offer of volun-
tary monitoring. However, if the initial equilibrium contracts are Wilson-Myazaki-
Spence cross-subsidizing, the welfare implications are ambiguous. While low risks are 
still made better off both from an ex ante and from an ex post point of view, high risk 
individuals might be made better off from an ex post point of view with some probabil-
ity, but - unless individuals’ risk aversion is sufficiently small - they will be made worse 
off from an ex ante point of view. Hence, in this case no Pareto-type improvement takes 
place. - 28 - 
Appendix 
A1 Optimal Contracts Problem (1)-(4) 
Denoting by Z  the Lagrangian, we get the following first-order conditions: 
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After substituting the above terms into the first-order conditions, the optimality condi-
tion (5) is derived from (A.2). And the optimality condition (6) is derived from (A.4). - 29 - 
A2 Derivation of eq. (7) 
Suppose  *1 i = . From the first-order condition (A.6) it follows that  * *
LL L rp d =⋅ , i.e. 
low risk premium is actuarially fair. In order for the optimality condition (5)  
'( *) '( * *) '( *) (1 )
0
'( *) '( * *) ( )
HL L L LL
LL LH L
uW r uW L r d uW r p p
uW r uW L r d p p
⎡⎤ −⋅ − − +−− − ⋅ ⎣⎦ =⋅
−⋅ − −+ −
  
to be satisfied, the right hand side of the equality must be zero, which is only possible 
when *
L dL =  (complete insurance for low risks).  Inserting these results into the first-
order condition (A.4), we get  
(1 )
'(1) '( ) ( )
LH L q




+= ⋅ − ⋅⋅ ⋅ − , from which it follows  
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'(1) '( ) ( )
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gu W p L L p p
q
−
≤⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − .  
A3 Proof of Proposition 3 
**
j jj rp d =⋅ ,  {,} jH L ∈ ⇔ *0 i =   
•  If 







 and hence  0 μ = . After inserting  *0 i =  into 
the first-order conditions, for (A.4) we get 
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Since '(0) 0 g =  by construction, the condition can be satisfied only if  * 0
HH pLr ⋅− =. 
But then, from (A.6) it follows that  * * 0
LL L rp d − ⋅= . ⁭ 
•  Only if 
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. Suppose now that  *0 i > . For the first-order con-
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0 i >  by construction. Hence  *0 i >  cannot be a solution.  Only for  *0 i =  the first-order 







 is satisfied. ⁭  
Similarly it can be shown that  *0 i > ⇔ *
HH rp L < ⋅  and  * *
LL L rp d >⋅ . 
A4 Optimal Subsidy Problem (9)-(11) 
The solution is analogous to A1. The first-order conditions for the maximization prob-
lem are 
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. Similarly to section A1 it can be shown that  *0 i =  ⇔ 0 s = . For  *0 i >  
and  0 s >  the optimality conditions (12) and (13) are derived. 
A5 Proof of proposition 6 
Since in equilibrium low risks reveal  *0 i > , they prefer the information contract 
* L C  to 
the conventional contract 
LS C , i.e.  ( *, *) ( ,0)
LL LL S EV C i EV C > .⇔  - 31 - 
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H LH L S EU C g i EU C −> . Due to the self-selection constraints for the initial 
WMS cross subsidizing equilibrium and for the optimal contracts in the good risk 
group, we have  ( ) ( )
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But it also holds that  ( ) ( )
H HS H HK EU C EU C > , since with 
HS C  while still getting full 
insurance, high risks have to pay less than fair premium. Hence we have that 
(A.14)  
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This inequality is identical to (14) and states that once high risks discover, that they are 
able to mimic low risks at  * i , they will have a higher expected utility from doing so 
than from withholding the information.  
From an ex ante point of view high risks will accept the information contract if the ex-
pected utility from doing so is larger than the expected utility from rejecting the infor-
mation contract. Since low risks reveal a non-zero amount of information in equilib-
rium, individuals, who reject the information contract, will be recognized as high risks 
by insurers. Due to the assumption of no commitment, insurers will adjust the contract 
set for the next period and will offer 
HK C  to individuals who reveal no information. So, 
ex ante high risks anticipate that the former equilibrium contract 
HS C  will be withdrawn 
and replaced by 
HK C . They will accept the information contract, if 
(A.15) 
* (1 *) ( ) * ( ) (1 *) ( *) ( )
H HH H K H H K i E UC iE UC i g i E UC −⋅ + ⋅ − −⋅ >  
This is identical to (A.14) and, as was shown, will always hold.  - 32 - 
A6 Conditions for inequality  (17) 
Let Δ be the difference between the expected utility from the information contract and 
the expected utility from the conventional contract,  
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Then high risks will ex ante prefer the information contract, which is equivalent to high 
risks being better off through the offer of a monitoring technology from an ex ante point 
of view, if  0 > Δ , and vice versa. Through direct substitution in (A.16) it is obvious that 
for  1 * = i , 0 ) ( ) ( < − = Δ
HS H HK H C EU C EU , i.e. if low risks reveal complete informa-
tion, high risks will be made worse off through the offer of an information contract.  
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Rearranging the expression and dropping opposite terms yields 
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The first two terms of the right hand side of (A.18) are negative for all  ) 1 , 0 ( *∈ i . The 
last term is negative, if  
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If this inequality holds, then it is certain, that  0 < Δ , and thus high risks are made worse 
off through the offer of information contracts.  
As can be seen from (A.18), the reverse is not true. The condition for high risks to ex 
ante prefer the information contract to the conventional contract, is more restrictive: 
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Hence, unless the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is small enough, high risks will 
prefer the conventional contract to the information contract, i.e. they will be made 
worse off if a monitoring technology is offered. ⁭  - 34 - 
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